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Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory 
BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY.  By Joseph 
Fishkin.  New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.   
288 pages.  $35.00. 
Samuel R. Bagenstos* 
Introduction 
In American antidiscrimination theory, two positions have competed for 
primacy.1  One, anticlassification, sees the proper goal of antidiscrimination 
law as being essentially individualistic.2  The problem with discrimination, 
in this view, is that it classifies individuals on the basis of an irrelevant or 
arbitrary characteristic—and that it, as a result, denies them opportunities for 
which they are otherwise individually qualified.  The other position, anti-
subordination, sees the proper goal of antidiscrimination law as being more 
group oriented.3  The problem with discrimination, in this view, is that it 
helps constitute a social system in which particular groups are systematically 
subject to disadvantage and stigma.  Anticlassification and antisubordination 
may provide equal support for some aspects of the antidiscrimination project: 
Brown v. Board of Education4 can bear both an anticlassification and an 
 
 *    Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. For an introduction to these two positions, which persuasively suggests that they are more 
interdependent, and less in conflict, than is commonly assumed, see generally Jack M. Balkin & 
Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). 
2. See id. at 10 (“Roughly speaking, this [anticlassification] principle holds that the government 
may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for 
example, their race.”). 
3. See id. at 9–10 (“Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship 
cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue that law should 
reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed 
groups.”). 
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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antisubordination reading.5  Loving v. Virginia6 expressly relied on both 
anticlassification and antisubordination arguments.7  But on other key 
issues—such as disparate impact and affirmative action—advocates of anti-
classification theory have squared off against advocates of antisubordination 
theory.8 
The stakes in the dispute between anticlassification and antisub-
ordination thus have appeared to be quite high.9  Yet there is something that 
seems inadequate about both anticlassification and anti-subordination 
theories.  Adherents to anticlassification theory have not given a good 
explanation for why an individualist should care about race or sex 
discrimination any more than discrimination based on eye color, for example.  
Any explanation of this difference seems necessarily to fall back on the 
historic wrong and continuing effects of discrimination against racial 
minorities and women—and the need to continue to disestablish that wrong 
and those effects.  Anticlassification theory thus seems, at bottom, to be 
rooted in antisubordination-like principles.10  Antisubordination theory, by 
contrast, has uncomfortable overtones of group rights, which stand in tension 
with widespread notions of individualism and merit and which threaten to 
 
5. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 1, at 11–12 (“Cases like Brown . . . contained language 
condemning the practice of classifying citizens by race as well as language condemning practices 
that enforced subordination or inflicted status harm.” (footnote omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, Equality 
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–75 (2004) (proposing that the two doctrines both grew out of the struggle 
to interpret and implement Brown).  Professor Bruce Ackerman argues that Brown does not imple-
ment an anticlassification or antisubordination principle but instead reflects an “anti-humiliation” 
principle. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 128–29, 137–
41 (2014).  Although it is beyond the scope of this Review to develop the point, I will simply note 
that I see the anti-humiliation principle as largely reflecting and replicating many of the problems 
with, the anticlassification principle. 
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
7. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
8. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 961 (2012) (treating affirmative action policies as measures serving 
antisubordination, not anticlassification, purposes); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and 
the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2006) (distinguishing the 
treatment of the disparate impact doctrine under anticlassification principles from its treatment 
under antisubordination principles). 
9. I say “appeared to be” because I think there is nothing inherent in antisubordination theory 
that compels a particular conclusion regarding disparate impact or affirmative action.  Nor do I think 
there is anything in anticlassification theory that compels a particular conclusion on these matters.  
Cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 1, at 14–20 (discussing inconsistencies in the implementation and 
application of the anticlassification principle).  I hope to explore these points in future work.  For 
now though, it is enough to note that adherents to anticlassification have tended to line up on 
different sides from adherents to antisubordination on these matters. 
10. Siegel, supra note 5, at 1477.  For similar discussions of problems with the anticlassification 
theory, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 846–48 (2003); David A. Strauss, The Myth of 
Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 120–26. 
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further underscore and entrench divisions based on race and sex.11  As Reva 
Siegel has shown, key Supreme Court Justices have responded to that threat 
by developing a third approach to antidiscrimination theory; an approach she 
labels antibalkanization.12  But antibalkanization may be best understood as 
a pragmatic set of ad hoc compromises between anticlassification and 
antisubordination, rather than a theory on which to build antidiscrimination 
law. 
One of the many contributions of Joey Fishkin’s impressive new book 
is to offer a possible way out of this morass.  Professor Fishkin offers an 
“anti-bottleneck” theory of equal opportunity.  Like anticlassification theory, 
Professor Fishkin’s theory is fundamentally individualistic.  The theory aims 
to attack or mitigate the effects of practices that keep individuals from 
pursuing the full range of opportunities to construct and live out their lives as 
they choose.  Professor Fishkin argues that the fundamental value served by 
equal opportunity is not equality so much as a form of autonomy or choice.13  
He contends that we care about equal opportunity because we care about 
ensuring that people can, to the extent possible, be the authors of their own 
life stories—that they can formulate, and have means to reach, their own 
goals for a life well lived.14  Rather than simply redistributing resources and 
opportunities to equalize people’s chances of fairly competing for or 
obtaining a set of societally valued outcomes, Professor Fishkin argues that 
we should structure society so that individuals can effectively choose what 
sorts of lives and outcomes they value.15  This goal may well require 
substantial redistribution of resources.  The ability to achieve—or even 
conceive of—many life plans depends on prior developmental and 
educational opportunities, as well as financial security.16  But the goal 
remains ultimately to promote each individual’s effective ability to choose.17 
Because of his concern with promoting individuals’ opportunities 
throughout their life course to choose the kinds of lives they wish to live, 
Professor Fishkin pays special attention to those social practices that are 
“bottlenecks”—narrow passages that an individual must traverse to have 
access to an array of opportunities.18  The bottleneck concept has wide 
 
11. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 5, at 1472–73 (stating that the anticlassification theory better 
aligns with the tradition of equal protection “that is committed to individuals rather than groups”). 
12. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011). 
13. See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 46–47, 
120–21 (2014) (“[P]art of the distinctive appeal of equal opportunity is that it enables people to 
pursue goals in life that are to a greater degree their own, rather than being dictated by the limited 
opportunities that were available to them.”). 
14. Id. at 120–21. 
15. Id. at 43, 120–21. 
16. Id. at 124–28. 
17. Id. at 127–28. 
18. Id. at 13, 156–60. 
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application.  College entrance examinations might be bottlenecks,19 but so 
too might be race or social-class status.20  Each of these phenomena limits 
access to many opportunities.  When bottlenecks exist, Professor Fishkin 
urges, equal opportunity demands that society work either to widen them 
(e.g., by providing improved primary and secondary education that enables 
more people to succeed on SATs)21 or to find a way around them (e.g., by 
promoting community colleges for those who do not score well on SATs or 
by eliminating college-degree requirements for jobs for which they are 
unnecessary).22  Professor Fishkin argues that antidiscrimination law, in 
particular, should be understood as serving this anti-bottleneck purpose.23 
As Professor Fishkin argues forcefully, nothing in the anti-bottleneck 
theory rests on a concern with group-based disadvantage, and nothing in that 
theory purports to accord rights to groups.  At the same time, the anti-
bottleneck theory resembles the antisubordination theory in its sensitivity to 
social context.  As Professor Fishkin emphasizes, at any given moment in 
society some practices may be bottlenecks only for members of some groups, 
and it is appropriate to take account of that—not to provide rights to groups, 
but simply to ensure that we are protecting all individuals in their range of 
opportunities to choose how to live their lives.  
Professor Fishkin’s book is fresh, smart, and extremely interesting.  It 
ranges widely across matters of political theory, law, and policy, both in and 
out of the antidiscrimination context.  Professor Fishkin’s argument is an 
appealing one.  All serious students of antidiscrimination law—and equality 
and inequality more generally—must now engage and build on that 
argument. 
Despite its great strengths, I argue in this Review that the anti-bottleneck 
principle fails as a justifying theory for antidiscrimination law.  To be sure, 
the principle identifies an important normative consideration in justifying and 
applying the law in this area.  Indeed, that principle may even fit some aspects 
of that law better than do the anticlassification and antisubordination theories.  
But the anti-bottleneck principle can do no more than that.  Its normative 
underpinnings are too unstable to give clear guidance in how to craft an 
antidiscrimination regime.  Fairly read, it can justify only a slice of the widely 
defended heartland of antidiscrimination law—and it might plausibly be read 
to demand quite broad exceptions from the antidiscrimination principle even 
within that heartland.  And the anti-bottleneck principle’s apparent accom-
modation between individual- and group-based understandings of anti-
discrimination law, while perhaps clear in principle, is largely illusory in 
practice. 
 
19. Id. at 148–50. 
20. Id. at 13, 157. 
21. Id. at 208–09. 
22. Id. at 146–49. 
23. Id. at 20–21. 
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In this Review, I elaborate those points.  Part I explains the internal 
tension at the heart of Professor Fishkin’s theory of opportunity pluralism.  
Part II highlights the degree to which an anti-bottleneck approach would 
justify only some of the existing applications of antidiscrimination law and 
would support quite broad exceptions to even those applications that it might 
seem, on its face, to justify.  Part III discusses individualism and groups and 
argues that an anti-bottleneck approach to antidiscrimination law is likely to 
confront many of the same problems as an antisubordination theory. 
I. The Internal Instability of Opportunity Pluralism 
There is a tension at the heart of Professor Fishkin’s conception of 
opportunity pluralism.  The value of opportunity pluralism, Professor Fishkin 
argues, is a fundamentally liberal one of ensuring that individuals can, to the 
greatest extent possible, decide at any given point in their lives what life goals 
to pursue and maximize their chances of achieving those goals.  Professor 
Fishkin describes the value as that of “giv[ing] individuals the space to reflect 
in a more personal and ongoing way about what paths they would like to 
pursue and what goals in life they value”24 and as that of enabling “each of 
us to become, in [Joseph] Raz’s terms, ‘part author of his life.’”25  Professor 
Fishkin understands that we do not author our lives in isolation—that is why 
we are only “part author.”  Rather, “we build our ambitions and goals out of 
the materials to which we have access.”26  Preferences and values, he 
recognizes, are to a significant extent endogenous to “our developmental 
opportunities and experiences.”27 
Professor Fishkin seems to me entirely right on both of these points.  
Enabling individuals to be authors of their own life stories is an important 
value.  And preferences and goals are to a large extent endogenous to social 
context.  But taken together, these two points mean that the principle of 
opportunity pluralism can provide no general basis for determining what sorts 
of interventions, to preserve what sorts of opportunities, are appropriate.  
Because of the endogeneity of preferences, we cannot simply leave people to 
choose what they will.  An individual’s education, family background, and 
economic station—as well as myriad other elements of the structure of 
society—will constrain not just the opportunities available to that individual 
but also the individual’s own ability to formulate, and even perceive the 
possibility of, different life goals.  We must therefore intervene to ensure that 
individuals have the opportunity to perceive and formulate their life goals 
and to remove undue obstacles to pursuing them.  But the goal of respecting 
an individual’s choice of how to write the story of that individual’s life cannot 
tell us what opportunities to provide.  At least this is true beyond the minimal 
 
24. Id. at 17. 
25. Id. at 121 (quoting JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370 (1986)). 
26. Id. at 123. 
27. Id. at 124. 
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“essential developmental opportunities” such as language acquisition, 
emotional development, and executive function that are necessary to make 
virtually any choices of social significance.28  To decide what choices and 
opportunities to preserve and foster, we need a theory that goes beyond 
simply respecting an individual’s own life plan. 
Professor Fishkin recognizes this problem.  He responds by advocating 
what he calls a thin perfectionism.29  He argues that where we have to choose, 
we should select interventions that secure a broader rather than a narrower 
range of opportunities.30  “By breadth,” he says, he “mean[s] not the number 
of opportunities in the bundle, but the diversity of paths that this bundle of 
opportunities opens up that leads to valued forms of human flourishing.”31  
Professor Fishkin gives the example of a child “whose parents believe she is 
a violin prodigy” and who “do not allow her to go to school or meet other 
children, or to learn about non-violin pursuits.”32  This child confronts a 
constrained range of opportunities, and it should be no surprise if she 
ultimately forms the goal and preference of devoting her life to the violin.33  
After all, what else does she know?  By cutting her off from the opportunity 
to develop any other goals and preferences, we might readily conclude that 
the child’s parents are limiting her to a narrower range of opportunities than 
she would have if they permitted her to go to school and live life as a typical 
child.34  We might reach that conclusion even if allowing her to live life as a 
typical child diverts her attention from the violin and therefore deprives her 
of the opportunity to become “the greatest violinist who ever lived.”35 
But this response is too facile.  The value underlying Professor Fishkin’s 
theory of opportunity pluralism is not diversity; it is choice—choice about 
how to write one’s life story.  But there is an important respect in which, no 
matter what we do, our young violinist has no choice.  If we allow her parents 
to force her to devote herself to practicing the violin, then she cannot choose 
to become anything but a violinist.  But if we require her parents to give her 
a more typical childhood experience, then she will be unable to choose to 
become a top-flight violinist.  Perhaps, if we could put our young violinist in 
a bastardized form of the “original position,” before her opportunity set 
forked out into these two different paths, she might say that she would choose 
the path of complete devotion to the violin.36  Or perhaps it’s simply 
 
28. See id. at 124–28 (asserting that society is structured in a way that makes some develop-
mental opportunities essential to proceed along “many or even most of the paths . . . society offers”). 
29. Id. at 186–87. 
30. Id. at 186–87, 191. 
31. Id. at 190. 




36. I use the concept of the original position here as an analogy.  In John Rawls’s canonical 
statement of the original position, it is one in which individuals do not know their “particular 
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nonsensical to talk about what our young violinist would value if she were 
able to abstract from her own life experiences because it is one’s life 
experiences that construct what one values and pursues.  Either way, the 
value of choice does not give us an answer to the question of which 
opportunity set to make available.  There is value in providing a wider array 
of life paths, but there is also value in providing certain unique life paths.  If 
we always choose the wider array, we may systematically deny individuals 
the opportunity to choose the unique paths.  Any such decision requires a 
more significant normative assessment of the value of particular life choices.  
In other words, it requires a thicker version of perfectionism than Professor 
Fishkin appears willing to defend. 
The problem extends even more broadly.  Many of the most important 
questions that we view through the lens of equal opportunity pit one person’s 
choices against another’s.  Take one of Professor Fishkin’s core examples—
integration in housing and schools.37  Professor Fishkin is surely right that 
such integration creates a context that expands many individuals’ 
understandings of the life paths they may wish to pursue—and that expands 
many individuals’ ability to achieve the goals they choose.38  But 
interventions that require integration will almost certainly override the 
considered choices of others who wish to live or be educated in a segregated 
setting.39  If we permit segregation (whether de jure or de facto) we will 
foreclose a set of opportunities for many individuals to form and pursue 
particular life plans for which living an integrated life is, practically, a 
prerequisite.  But if we require integration, we will foreclose the opportunity 
to choose and pursue a life that is in significant respects isolated from those 
who differ in socially salient ways. 
This tension, though not framed in these precise terms, has given rise to 
one of the most enduring arguments in civil rights law.40  And the value of 
choice gives us no basis to resolve it.  We must decide whose choice to 
endorse: the choice of the person who wants to live an integrated life (and the 
choices of the person she might become in the future if she has the 
opportunities an integrated life opens up) or the choice of the person who 
 
inclinations and aspirations” or their “conceptions of their good.”  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 18 (1971).  Here, of course, I’m imagining a world in which we can access our young 
violinist’s inclinations, aspirations, and conceptions of the good before we decide the path on which 
to place her. 
37. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 212–19. 
38. Id. at 214–17. 
39. See id. at 214 (noting some parents may expressly or implicitly “care . . . about peer 
demographics”). 
40. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2014) (acknowledging the fundamental 
objection that “civil rights laws intrude[] too deeply into private decisions”). 
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wants to live a segregated life.  To answer this question requires a normative 
assessment of the value of particular choices.41 
Professor Fishkin astutely recognizes this problem.  In response, he 
suggests that the principle of opportunity pluralism should be implemented 
with “a rough version of prioritarianism.”42  Drawing on Derek Parfit’s 
definition of prioritarianism—that “[b]enefiting people matters more the 
worse off these people are”43—Fishkin argues that “[p]riority of opportunity 
holds that broadening someone’s range of opportunities matters more the 
narrower that range is.”44  Thus, when forced to choose between promoting 
the choices of two individuals whose life plans or potential life plans are in 
conflict, we should favor the individual whose “current range of oppor-
tunities is narrower.”45 
When we think about racial and economic integration in the United 
States, Professor Fishkin’s answer seems quite appealing.  African-
Americans, Latinos, and poor people who live and go to school in circum-
stances of racial and economic segregation are plainly deprived of a wide 
range of opportunities—a deprivation that, because of segregation, is likely 
to ramify throughout their lives.46  Promoting integration thus seems like 
Professor Fishkin’s example of a surtax on wealthy city residents to provide 
schools to children in a poor rural area—the cost to the already advantaged 
in opportunity lost is far outweighed by the benefit to the currently 
disadvantaged in opportunity gained.47 
But when we put the argument in these terms, we lose what had looked 
like the distinctive benefit of Professor Fishkin’s opportunity-pluralist 
theory.  That theory was supposed to get us beyond distributive justice.48  But 
it turns out that we cannot address some central applications of the theory 
 
41. Stated in this way, it is easy to see how the problem for Professor Fishkin’s argument is 
similar to the essential problem confronted by Herbert Wechlser’s argument that free association 
could not be a neutral principle that justified Brown v. Board.  See Herbert Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (“Given a situation where 
the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it 
or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the 
Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?”).  For an instructive discussion 
of Wechsler on Brown, see Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral 
Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1053–60 (2009). 
42. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 190–91. 
43. Id. at 191 (quoting Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN 
AMERICA 23–24 (2014) (highlighting the poverty, unemployment, and underperforming schools 
found in segregated neighborhoods that “create a closed loop of systemic disadvantage”); Richard 
Rothstein, The Urban Poor Shall Inherit Poverty, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 7, 2014, http://prospect.org 
/article/urban-poor-shall-inherit-poverty, archived at http://perma.cc/U2J4-SBWD (highlighting 
lasting disadvantages that coincide with neighborhood segregation). 
47. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 188. 
48. Id. at 41. 
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without engaging in an explicitly distributive analysis.  And the distributive 
analysis itself will often be complex.  How do we assess the desire for 
segregation of members of a cohesive religious minority or an ethnic group 
that is now, but was not always, understood as “white” in the United States?49  
Individuals in these groups may face continuing prejudice and other external 
limitations on their opportunities to develop and pursue their own life goals, 
but they may also be in a position to deny opportunities to others who 
themselves face limitations on their opportunities.  How does the prioritarian 
distributive analysis help us decide? 
In the end, Professor Fishkin makes a powerful case that opportunity 
pluralism is one consideration to which we should attend in making decisions 
about what justice requires.  But, as he candidly acknowledges, it is not the 
only one.50  As the cases get more important and controversial, the 
opportunity-pluralist principle, and the value of authorship of one’s life that 
underlies it, becomes less helpful in providing a resolution.  This is not a 
purely abstract point.  As I argue in the next Part, this limitation of 
opportunity pluralism makes it a poor fit with our antidiscrimination laws. 
II. What Antidiscrimination Laws Can the Anti-bottleneck Principle 
Justify? 
Although I have argued that the opportunity-pluralist principle cannot 
resolve the hard cases, the principle plainly points to something important.  
The chance to serve as part author of one’s life story is one many people seek 
for themselves, and it is one that seems objectively valuable.  Professor 
Fishkin is persuasive that opportunity pluralism—and the anti-bottleneck 
principle that he derives from it—offers fresh and useful insight into what is 
at stake in antidiscrimination law.  In particular, it offers a very generative 
third way of thinking about disparate impact law in employment.  Under the 
law of disparate impact, as announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Company51 
and codified twenty years later in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a hiring 
criterion is discriminatory if it has a significantly disproportionate impact on 
a group defined by race or sex and if the employer cannot show that it is “job 
related . . . and consistent with business necessity.”52  Jurists and scholars 
 
49. On the normatively complex interaction between ideas of ethnicity and race, see generally 
Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007). 
50. See FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 156 (recognizing that opportunity pluralism must be 
“balanced against other values”). 
51. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).  There is some dispute in the literature whether 
disparate impact law can be applied in cases in which a plaintiff alleges an unlawful impact on 
whites or men.  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact 
Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1565 (2004) (concluding that applying the theory 
to whites or men would be ahistorical but that limiting the theory to minorities and women would 
fail an equal protection analysis).  For what it’s worth, my view is that the language of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 leaves no room for refusing to apply the theory to such cases. 
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have tended to think of disparate impact law as serving one of two possible 
functions: evidentiary (smoking out hidden discriminatory intent) or 
distributive (ensuring that minorities or women are not disproportionately 
shut out of jobs, at least without a sufficiently good reason).53  The 
evidentiary function of disparate impact fits well with anticlassification 
theory, the distributive function with antisubordination theory.54  But 
Professor Fishkin’s focus on bottlenecks leads us to a different dimension of 
disparate impact law.  Disparate impact has been a successful theory in only 
a limited set of employment discrimination cases—primarily those involving 
certain kinds of hiring or promotion criteria, such as pencil-and-paper tests 
or height, weight, strength, or agility requirements.55  As Professor Fishkin 
notes, at the time the Court decided Griggs such hiring criteria were being 
adopted widely.56  Absent the disparate impact doctrine, a person who 
performed poorly on, say, the Wonderlic test of general intelligence57 would 
likely be foreclosed from a wide array of good jobs—even if that person 
would in fact be able to perform well on the job. 
Wholly independent of its evidentiary or distributive functions, the 
disparate impact doctrine has operated to keep tests like the Wonderlic from 
becoming an unjustified bottleneck to opportunity.  And this anti-bottleneck 
justification in fact lies very close to the surface of Chief Justice Burger’s 
Griggs opinion.  Much of that opinion describes the problem with overly 
rigid hiring criteria in terms that do not speak at all of race or sex but rather 
resonate strongly with a concern about barriers to anyone’s opportunity.  In 
one of the most telling passages, Chief Justice Burger explains: 
 The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and 
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or 
degrees as fixed measures of capability.  History is filled with 
examples of men and women who rendered highly effective 
performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in 
terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees.  Diplomas and tests are 
useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense 
proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.58 
 
53. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 493, 518–20, 523–25 (2003). 
54. The two positions are not symmetrical.  An adherent of anticlassification theory will have 
a difficult time embracing the distributive account of disparate impact, but an adherent of 
antisubordination theory could readily embrace the evidentiary account. 
55. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 22–24 (observing that courts are less likely to entertain 
disparate impact challenges to “subjective employment practices” than to more objective tests); 
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705 (2006) 
(noting that disparate impact theory has “proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to written 
examinations”). 
56. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 165. 
57. The Wonderlic Personnel Test was one of the tests used by Duke Power at issue in Griggs.  
Selmi, supra note 55, at 718 & n.69. 
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971). 
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And in the last substantive sentence of the opinion, Chief Justice Burger 
describes its rule in these terms: “What Congress has commanded is that any 
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the 
abstract.”59  It is hard to explain these passages as focusing on either the 
evidentiary function of the disparate impact doctrine in smoking out hidden 
discriminatory intent or the distributive function of that doctrine in protecting 
minorities and women from losing access to opportunities.  Rather, these 
passages focus directly on the problem of tests as an unjustified bottleneck to 
anyone who cannot pass them but would nonetheless succeed in the jobs to 
which they control access.  The standard theories of disparate impact 
suppress this key point; Professor Fishkin’s theory highlights it. 
Although Professor Fishkin offers an account of disparate impact law 
that improves on other theories of discrimination, it is not clear that his theory 
does any better job than anticlassification or antisubordination theories in 
justifying or explaining the rest of antidiscrimination law.60  Indeed, the anti-
bottleneck theory actually justifies far less of the existing sweep of anti-
discrimination law than do those other theories.  The anti-bottleneck theory 
is limited in both the domains and the decisions within those domains to 
which it justifies applying an antidiscrimination regime. 
Take the domains first.  Professor Fishkin’s theory justifies guaranteeing 
individuals access to those domains that provide opportunities to formulate 
and achieve goals about how to live one’s life.  That theory fits well with a 
prohibition on discrimination in access to jobs and educational opportunities.  
As Professor Fishkin amply demonstrates, without a sufficient education 
many individuals will lack the knowledge and imagination to even formulate, 
much less achieve, a range of life goals.61  And economic means are often 
essential to achieving life goals as well.62  Professor Fishkin also shows that 
racial and economic integration in housing and education can serve an 
important function in expanding individuals’ sense of the types of life paths 
from which they might choose.63 
Professor Fishkin’s theory thus provides an explanation and justification 
for applying antidiscrimination rules to employment, education, and 
housing—though, outside of the disparate impact context, it is not clear that 
it provides a better explanation and justification than do the preexisting 
theories.  But that theory does not fit nearly as well with other core 
applications of antidiscrimination law.  The Voting Rights Act’s rule 
 
59. Id. at 436. 
60. Professor Fishkin argues that his theory justifies the broad sweep of antidiscrimination law 
because race (like the other forbidden classifications) is itself a bottleneck to opportunity.  FISHKIN, 
supra note 13, at 174.  As I argue in the next Part, this argument ultimately adds nothing to the 
antisubordination theory. 
61. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
62. See FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 200–05 (discussing how money acts as a bottleneck by 
limiting available opportunities and influencing priorities). 
63. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
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prohibiting discrimination in election procedures,64 for example, does not 
easily fit the anti-bottleneck theory.  Rather, as Professor Fishkin has astutely 
shown in his other work, a prohibition on voting discrimination protects an 
individual’s rights to be treated as a full and equal citizen and to join with 
other like-minded individuals in seeking to elect the candidates of their 
choice and influence policy.65  These justifications are well captured by 
anticlassification or antisubordination theory.  They have nothing to do with 
bottlenecks or opportunity pluralism.  Similarly, the prohibition on 
discrimination in private places of public accommodation—the most con-
troversial piece of the 1964 Civil Rights Act66—is best justified as preventing 
humiliation or a harm to equal citizenship rather than as overcoming 
bottlenecks to opportunity.  Although integration may promote opportunity 
pluralism by providing individuals with models of different life paths, the 
sorts of interactions that customers experience when they patronize 
integrated businesses are far more fleeting than the interactions they 
experience in integrated neighborhoods, schools, or workplaces.67 
Even within the domains it does reach, the opportunity-pluralist theory 
would support broad exceptions from antidiscrimination laws.  At least since 
the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one of the most significant 
controversies regarding antidiscrimination law has involved the application 
of that law to businesses whose owners strongly believe (for religious or 
simply ideological reasons) in discrimination.68  That controversy remains 
especially salient today following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.69  Hobby Lobby interpreted the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)70 to exempt certain for-profit 
corporations from the Affordable Care Act provisions ensuring that their 
employees receive insurance coverage for contraception.71  That decision will 
likely give added momentum to an ongoing litigation campaign in which 
businesses claim that the application of antidiscrimination laws to them—
 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2012). 
65. Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 
1298–1300 (2011). 
66. Bagenstos, supra note 40, at 1206. 
67. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 843–44 (explaining that working on common projects in 
an integrated workplace reduces prejudice and stereotyping); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working 
Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 22–25 (2000) (describing 
evidence that intergroup contact reduces prejudice in sustained, cooperative interactions under 
circumstances of relative equality). 
68. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
69. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012). 
71. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (holding that “the contraceptive mandate, as applied 
to closely held corporations, violates RFRA”). 
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particularly in the context of sexual-orientation discrimination—impairs their 
free exercise of religion and their freedom of association.72 
Business owners seeking religion- or association-based exemptions 
from antidiscrimination law might find a great deal of support in Professor 
Fishkin’s theory.  As I discussed in the previous Part, Professor Fishkin 
acknowledges that it is not possible to guarantee every individual access to 
every single opportunity.  At an operational level, opportunity pluralism is 
satisfied if every individual has a sufficiently large range of opportunities 
from which to choose.73  And Professor Fishkin recognizes that, after some 
point, the marginal benefit of increasing the opportunities available to an 
individual must be traded off against the costs of doing so.74  Allowing 
business owners with sincere objections to opt out of an antidiscrimination 
law is unlikely, these days, to deprive many individuals of any significant 
opportunities to choose and pursue particular life paths.  For every business 
owner with such objections, there are owners of other similar businesses who 
will be perfectly willing to provide nondiscriminatory treatment.  And 
allowing business owners with sincere objections to opt out may in fact be 
necessary to preserve the owner’s opportunity to choose and pursue a life 
path that involves commitment to an ideological or religious doctrine that 
mandates certain forms of discrimination.75  An opportunity-pluralist regime, 
with its basic commitment to ensuring that individuals can be part authors of 
their lives to the extent possible—without judging what they choose their life 
story to be—may actually compel extension of the Hobby Lobby principle to 
the antidiscrimination context. 
In making this point, I am under no illusions that I am making a 
devastating critique of Professor Fishkin’s argument.  Plenty of scholars 
agree that sincere religious or ideological objectors should have the right to 
opt out of antidiscrimination laws—at least in a social context in which 
sufficiently few businesses would opt out that individuals subject to 
discrimination would continue to have a range of nondiscriminatory 
businesses to which to turn.  Mark Graber has called this the “Lockean 
Compromise”—“that persons ought to be allowed to discriminate . . . as long 
as doing so does not burden others.”76  And virtually nobody thinks that the 
 
72. See Bagenstos, supra note 40, at 1232–40 (examining cases that could broaden First 
Amendment or RFRA protection to for-profit corporations and limit the ability of the expressive–
commercial distinction to protect antidiscrimination safeguards). 
73. See supra Part I. 
74. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
75. Seana Shiffrin does not focus on discrimination, but she makes a more general argument 
that morally motivated decisions by business owners not to associate with others should, in at least 
some circumstances, trump regulations that would mandate association.  Seana Shiffrin, Compelled 
Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 325–27 (2007). 
76. Posting of Mark Graber, Professor, Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of Law, 
mgraber@law.umaryland.edu, to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (July 21, 2014, 10:13 AM), archived 
at http://perma.cc/Q7JQ-DRVN.  I am not sure that Professor Fishkin would agree with that 
compromise; my point is only that his theory would support it. 
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antidiscrimination principle should extend to every person or business who 
hires a worker or sells a good or service.  The fifteen-employee threshold for 
coverage under Title VII77 and the private-club and “Mrs. Murphy” 
exceptions to the federal laws prohibiting housing and public 
accommodations discrimination78 reflect the view that at some point the costs 
to efficiency and associational interests outweigh the application of 
antidiscrimination law.  But these limitations tend to be justified by the 
administrative and compliance burdens of applying the antidiscrimination 
regime to small businesses or by the especially powerful associational 
interests at stake in determining membership of private clubs or determining 
whom to allow to spend the night in one’s home.79  The Lockean 
Compromise, informed by Professor Fishkin’s theory, rests on something 
different.  It rests on the lack of a significant practical burden faced by an 
individual who experiences discrimination at one or several businesses but 
retains the opportunity to obtain the same services—and, in Professor 
Fishkin’s terms, pursue the same array of life paths—from other businesses. 
The Lockean Compromise would allow for much broader exceptions 
than those written in current law.  One who adheres to the anticlassification 
theory might conclude that every time an individual is denied a discrete 
opportunity because of his or her race or sex, the denial imposes an injury 
that is not sufficiently mitigated by the availability of the same opportunity 
from another business.  Although we might make an exception where 
especially strong associational or other interests appear on the other side, an 
anticlassificationist might say, the general rule should be that no business 
may discriminate based on race or sex.  An antisubordinationist might agree 
and argue that the existence of discrimination by individual businesses sends 
a message that entrenches the subordinated position of already disadvantaged 
groups.80  One can agree or disagree with these arguments.  But the key point 
 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
78. Id. § 2000a(b)(1), (e); id. § 3603(b)(2). 
79. Professor Emens suggests that the Mrs. Murphy exception is, instead, “a concession to fears 
of miscegenation.”  Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents 
of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1379 n.332 (2009). 
80. See Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036, 3052 
(2014).  Attempting to draw this distinction, Professor Hellman explains: 
The hotel’s refusal to rent a room to a black traveler expresses denigration of him and 
does so on behalf of an entity with some power in the marketplace.  The denial of the 
traveler’s equal worth is thus forceful.  The homeowner’s similar refusal also 
denigrates, but more softly or quietly, if you will.  I am not here emphasizing the 
effect—that the homeowner is likely to control a much smaller number of available 
rooms than the hotel owner.  This is surely true.  But, at the same time, if all 
homeowners in a region refuse to rent rooms to blacks, the effect could be quite 
significant.  Rather, I am exploring what each merchant does in refusing to rent the 
room.  The homeowner, as just one small homeowner who controls her own home, 
speaks her distasteful message softly and carries a small stick.  The hotel owner, by 
contrast, expresses largely the same message but does so in a loud voice and with a 
larger stick.  His place, as the owner of a business of some size, gives him power in 
our social system. 
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is that the anti-bottleneck theory is likely to justify much broader exceptions 
to the antidiscrimination principle than the anticlassification and anti-
subordination theories do.  For those who believe in a broader application of 
antidiscrimination law, that is an argument against the anti-bottleneck theory 
as a principle to organize this body of law. 
III. Of Individuals and Groups 
Perhaps, though, the individualism that underlies the anti-bottleneck 
theory makes it superior to existing theories of discrimination.  As I noted in 
the Introduction, the antisubordination theory suggests a notion of group 
rights—a notion that is in extreme tension with American traditions of 
individualism.81  And although the anticlassification theory seems individ-
ualistic, at bottom it too must be justified as an effort to protect subordinated 
or systematically disadvantaged groups.82  In contrast to those two theories, 
Professor Fishkin defends the anti-bottleneck theory as being individualistic 
all the way down.  Because it is concerned with practices that operate as 
bottlenecks to anyone’s opportunities, Professor Fishkin argues, the anti-
bottleneck theory is different from the alternative theories because “it does 
not rest directly on any claims about history or past discrimination”—and, 
indeed, “it does not require that any ‘group’ exist at all.”83  As a result, he 
contends the anti-bottleneck principle can “avoid unnecessarily reifying 
groups.”84  And it supports interventions (like removing pencil-and-paper 
testing requirements or “ban the box” laws that limit employers’ ability to 
ask applicants about their criminal records) that might help members of any 
group.85  It thus “emphasiz[es] . . . commonality rather than inter-group 
competition” and “provides a better basis for solidarity than initiatives whose 
beneficiaries are all members of a particular group.”86 
If true, these points would be powerful arguments for an anti-bottleneck 
theory of antidiscrimination law.  But I do not think they ultimately hold up.  
Although the anti-bottleneck theory, stated most abstractly, does not depend 
on the existence of any group, concern with group status and group harm 
creeps back in the instant Professor Fishkin begins to explain how it would 
apply concretely.  In application, the anti-bottleneck theory overlaps 
significantly with—and may be best understood as simply a variant of—
antisubordination theory.  Whether the anti-bottleneck principle can avoid 
reifying groups and whether it can promote solidarity, are empirical 
 
Id. 
81. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
82. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
83. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 238. 
84. Id. at 245. 
85. Id. at 165–67. 
86. Id. at 249. 
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questions.  But there are strong reasons to doubt that the principle will 
succeed in these goals. 
Start with the assertion that the anti-bottleneck theory does not depend 
on the existence of any group.  At the highest level of generality, this is surely 
true.  One who wants to ensure that individuals can choose from a range of 
life goals and paths should, all else equal, be concerned with any practice that 
limits any individual’s opportunities.  But all else is not equal.  As I have 
argued throughout this Review, it is simply impossible to achieve the goal of 
ensuring that every single individual has, at every single point in time, the 
opportunity to choose from every single possible life path.  Professor Fishkin, 
of course, acknowledges the point.87  But once we abandon that utopian goal, 
we need to know when society should intervene to promote opportunities. 
In elaborating the anti-bottleneck principle, Professor Fishkin is 
attentive to that concern.  It is possible for a social practice to constitute a 
bottleneck only for a single individual.  But Professor Fishkin argues that we 
should be most concerned with those practices that deprive many individuals 
of opportunities—particularly where they do so arbitrarily.88  As he 
acknowledges, race is a prime example of a pervasive, arbitrary bottleneck.89  
To the extent that the anti-bottleneck theory justifies a prohibition on race 
discrimination, it thus largely overlaps with the antisubordination theory, 
which is precisely concerned with the pervasive denial of opportunity 
attached to race.90  Professor Fishkin argues, however, that this overlap is 
basically coincidental.  Understanding “the long history of practices and 
government policies of racial subordination,” he says, “can help us 
understand why and how race acts as a bottleneck today” and thus “can help 
 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 28–31. 
88. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 167.  What counts as arbitrary here is itself laden with questions 
of value.  In some of his discussion, Professor Fishkin appears to equate arbitrariness with 
inefficiency.  See id. at 161 (positing that a legal system theoretically could require employers to 
provide a business justification for all types of business practices that create significant bottlenecks).  
But an exclusionary practice might well be economically inefficient but serve other goals (such as 
associational freedom) that we might find sufficiently valuable to justify the bottleneck it causes.  
Professor Fishkin acknowledges that “[l]egitimacy is not simply a matter of economic efficiency,” 
and he says that “[a] bottleneck is ‘legitimate’ to the extent that it serves goals that we deem to be 
legitimate.”  Id. at 162.  But it is unclear what other values might, in Professor Fishkin’s view, 
render a bottleneck legitimate or nonarbitrary. 
89. Id. at 173–74. 
90. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–09 (1986) (explaining that the antisubordination approach “seeks to 
eliminate the power disparities between . . . whites and non-whites”); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and 
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection 
Clause is concerned with the aggravation of “the subordinate status of blacks as a group”); Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Essay, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative 
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 951 (2001) (highlighting that the antisubordination theory is 
concerned with “requiring the elimination of society’s racism”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428–33 (1994) (contending that an important equality principle 
within American constitutional law has been the opposition to the caste system created, in part, by 
discrimination on the basis of race). 
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us settle on effective responses.”91  But “[f]rom the perspective of the anti-
bottleneck principle, the validity of antidiscrimination statutes covering race 
is entirely contingent on the empirical reality that race is a bottleneck in the 
opportunity structure.”92  “[I]n principle,” however, it is possible to have a 
pervasive bottleneck without any sort of group subordination.93 
To illustrate the point, Professor Fishkin gives the example of 
discrimination based on credit histories: 
Suppose that credit histories had never been invented; tomorrow 
someone invents them; and the next day, employers begin to use them 
to discriminate in hiring.  As soon as enough employers do so that the 
effect is to create a pervasive bottleneck, this should trigger our 
concern.  From the perspective of opportunity pluralism, the fact that 
people with bad credit now have trouble proceeding along many paths 
in the opportunity structure is enough, by itself, to justify a remedy 
such as, perhaps, a statute banning the use of credit checks in hiring.  
There need not be any history of discrimination, and people with poor 
credit need not know they have poor credit or think of themselves as 
part of a group of people with poor credit.  Indeed, they need not even 
know what a credit history is.  The severity of the bottleneck is 
sufficient.94 
This is surely true in principle.  But in practice such pervasive 
bottlenecks are likely to be difficult to disentangle from the sort of group-
based subordination that is the target of the antisubordination theory.  For one 
thing, if credit-history discrimination were sufficiently widely adopted to 
become a pervasive bottleneck for many individuals—and there is evidence 
that it is beginning to do so95—those individuals would not be in the dark 
about it for long.  As credit histories become more important in limiting 
access to opportunities, knowledge of that fact will spread, and people will 
begin to understand whether their credit scores have denied them 
opportunities.  As policy entrepreneurs seek protection against credit-history 
discrimination, they may well seek to develop a group consciousness among 
those whose credit histories make them likely to lose opportunities.96  By the 
 
91. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 238. 
92. Id. at 239. 
93. Id. at 238. 
94. Id. 
95. See, e.g., Editorial, Credit History Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/opinion/credit-history-discrimination.html?_r=1&, archived 
at http://perma.cc/A43J-FKEP (“About 60 percent of employers use credit checks to screen 
applicants, even though research has shown that people with damaged credit are not automatically 
poor job risks.”). 
96. For an historical parallel, consider the way that entrepreneurial disability-rights-movement 
activists successfully worked throughout the 1970s and 1980s to develop a pan-disability 
consciousness among individuals with a diverse array of physical and mental conditions who did 
not, at the beginning, see themselves as being part of a single group of people with disabilities.  
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 921, 1008–12 (2003). 
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time a practice becomes a pervasive bottleneck, then, those who are 
disadvantaged by the practice might well think of themselves—and be 
understood by society—as an identifiable, disadvantaged group.  If that is 
true, the anti-bottleneck principle will essentially represent a generalization 
of the antisubordination principle.  It recognizes that which groups are 
subordinated, and how those groups are identified, might change, but it still 
targets the harm of group-based subordination. 
But the connection between the anti-bottleneck principle and the 
antisubordination principle is even tighter than that.  Members of groups that 
have historically been subject to widespread discrimination and disadvantage 
are likely to be overrepresented among the individuals who are harmed by 
those practices (e.g., credit score discrimination97) that create pervasive 
bottlenecks to opportunity.  This is in part because of the compounding nature 
of subordination.  As members of racial groups are, for generations, denied 
opportunities, the opportunities available to members of those groups will be 
artificially narrowed in the generations to come, and economic disadvantage 
will come to track racial disadvantage.98  It also may reflect “selective 
sympathy and indifference.”99  Businesses and government agencies are most 
likely to adopt practices that deny opportunities to large numbers of 
individuals if those who formulate the practice do not sympathize or 
empathize with those who are likely to be excluded.100  Because race is so 
salient in our society, decision makers (who, statistically speaking, are 
unlikely to be members of minority groups)101 are less likely to be concerned 
about practices that exclude racial minorities.102 
And there may also be an important story of political organizing here.  
The civil rights label is a powerful one in American law and politics.103  In 
order to mobilize the legal and political system to attack a bottleneck, it may 
 
97. See, e.g., SHAWN FREMSTAD & AMY TRAUB, DEMOS, DISCREDITING AMERICA: THE 
URGENT NEED TO REFORM THE NATION’S CREDIT REPORTING INDUSTRY 11–12 (2011) (noting 
significant racial disparities in credit scores). 
98. For terrific recent discussions of this process, see generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, 
REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014); Ta-
Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/fea 
tures/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/, archived at http://perma.cc/9H2R-SPSU. 
99. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976). 
100.  See supra note 67. 
101.  See, e.g., Minority & Female Representation on Fortune 250 Boards & Executive Teams, 
RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, http://www.russellreynolds.com/content/diversity-in-leader 
ship, archived at http://perma.cc/RF88-S95P (finding that in June 2013, 84.4% of Fortune 250 board 
seats were held by white directors). 
102. This may not even be a conscious process.  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952–53 (2006) 
(discussing evidence of implicit or unconscious bias); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism 
Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 
CONN. L. REV. 931, 956–59 (2008) (elaborating on the significance of the same studies). 
103. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2852 (2014). 
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be necessary as a practical matter to make the case that the bottleneck 
systematically excludes people along the group lines that are the standard 
concern of civil rights laws.  As Professor Fishkin shows, the campaigns for 
laws restricting the use of criminal background in hiring have followed 
precisely this model.  To be sure, the laws that have passed in several states 
do not require the plaintiff to show racial discrimination in order to challenge 
the use of a criminal background check.104  But the concern that the use of 
such background checks has a racially discriminatory impact has been a 
principal motivator of the efforts to get those laws enacted—and a principal 
argument that advocates of those laws have used to win over legislators.105  
In practice, the law is likely to implement the anti-bottleneck principle largely 
in those contexts in which the antisubordination principle would lead to the 
same result. 
Professor Fishkin is at pains to emphasize that an anti-bottleneck 
principle might provide benefits not just to members of subordinated groups 
but to anyone who is excluded by the bottleneck the law attacks.  He points 
in particular to disparate impact law and laws regulating the use of criminal 
histories in hiring—two of his prime examples of anti-bottleneck regimes.  
“Instead of redistributing opportunities from one group to another,” he says, 
these regimes “focus[] on ameliorating particular bottlenecks that contribute 
to large group-based disparities.  By helping everyone through and around 
those bottlenecks, these cases and statutes provide a more universal form of 
relief.”106  True enough, but this does not distinguish the anti-bottleneck 
principle from the antisubordination principle.  After all, the disparate impact 
doctrine is often thought of as a paradigmatic application of anti-
subordination,107 and the antisubordination principle would support laws 
limiting the use of criminal history as well.  The antisubordination principle 
holds that the normative justification for civil rights laws is found in the value 
of protecting and advancing the interests of systematically disadvantaged 
groups.  But that principle in no way requires the operational structure of 
civil rights laws to be framed in group-based terms.108 
 
104. See FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 166–67, 244 (discussing these laws). 
105. Id. at 244. 
106. Id. at 249. 
107. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 8, at 971 (describing disparate impact as being “intrinsically 
about antisubordination”). 
108. Indeed, some antisubordinationists would argue that framing laws in group-based terms 
further entrenches widely held societal views of group-based difference and therefore feeds 
subordination.  Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination might be an example here.  See 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1341–42 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(describing opposition of “equal-treatment feminists” to pregnancy-only leave laws).  Mary Anne 
Case, who disclaims antisubordinationism, actually makes an antisubordinationist case for avoiding 
group-based treatment in the sex context in Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law 
Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1447, 1472–74 (2000). 
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And experience with disparate impact law throws some empirical cold 
water on Professor Fishkin’s hope that universally framed civil rights 
protections will provide a “basis for solidarity” across groups “[b]y 
emphasizing . . . commonality rather than inter-group competition.”109  The 
disparate impact doctrine remains the most controversial aspect of American 
antidiscrimination law, and it is constantly under political and judicial 
threat.110  That is true even though hiring practices that are invalidated 
because of their disparate impact typically exclude many whites and men as 
well as minorities and women.111  Given the social salience of race and sex, 
the broader public focuses on the primary intended beneficiaries of disparate 
impact doctrine and continues to view that doctrine as “really,” though 
perhaps inefficiently, distributing opportunities based on race and sex.112  At 
some level, they are surely right to do so—at least in the context of 
employment.  Unless the number of jobs available expands, any law 
regulating hiring criteria operates in a zero-sum game.113  A policy that 
requires employers to abandon selection practices that disproportionately 
harm minorities will—if it’s working—have the effect of redistributing 
(some) jobs from non-minorities to minorities.  It’s the zero-sum nature of 
the competition that is the fundamental threat to intergroup solidarity, and an 
antidiscrimination law—whether informed by the antisubordination 
 
109. FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 249. 
110. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 835 (describing disparate impact as “the most hotly 
contested part” of antidiscrimination law). 
111. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–30 & n.12 (1977); FISHKIN, supra note 13, at 
247. 
112. See Bagenstos, supra note 103, at 2854–55 (asserting that even broad policies, such as 
economically based affirmative action and flexible work arrangements, are likely to be viewed as 
targeting specific groups). 
113. Note that other applications of the disparate impact doctrine do not have this zero-sum 
quality.  Take, for example, the fair housing context—a context that has generated a great deal of 
controversy in recent years.  See Michael G. Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: 
A Practitioner’s Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 158 (2014) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari to consider whether there is a disparate impact cause of action under 
the Fair Housing Act and that the Department of Housing and Urban Development recently issued 
regulations addressing the question).  When a mortgage lender is found to have set interest rates 
according to criteria with an unjustified disparate impact, it can solve the problem without taking 
loans away from anyone who would otherwise receive them or giving anyone less favorable loan 
terms than they would otherwise receive.  See id. at 162–64 (describing allegations and the 
subsequent settlement in one such case).  And when a municipality has adopted zoning rules that 
disproportionately exclude racial minorities (e.g., limiting multifamily housing), it can solve the 
problem simply by removing those rules.  Although doing so may take away from residents the 
opportunity to avoid living near apartments—or the opportunity to avoid living in an integrated 
area—it will not exclude anyone who formerly could live in the community.  (And it likely will 
increase the supply of housing available in the community, thus expanding the pie of housing 
opportunities.)  See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact?  An Appellate 
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 
357, 417–19 (2013) (pointing out that a local government’s consideration of its zoning ordinances—
with the purpose of making sure racial minorities are not disproportionately excluded—does not 
harm any group and that courts should therefore not be too quick to find that such a practice violates 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
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principle, the anti-bottleneck principle, or something else—cannot solve that 
problem. 
Conclusion 
Although I have spent the bulk of this Review explaining why, in my 
view, the anti-bottleneck theory falls short in explaining and justifying 
antidiscrimination law, I should emphasize once again that Bottlenecks is a 
truly impressive book.  Even the most thoughtful and well-informed readers 
will come away from this book with a richer understanding of equal 
opportunity and the normative stakes of important legal and policy issues.  
The flaws in the book’s argument—at least as applied to antidiscrimination 
law—may simply be flaws inherent in antidiscrimination theory itself.  
Perhaps there is no theory that can explain or justify everything we want to 
do with the complex body of regulation that is antidiscrimination law.  Maybe 
the best that antidiscrimination theory can provide is a set of goals or 
considerations that can help us understand what is normatively at stake in 
disputes relating to that body of law.  On that score, Professor Fishkin has 
served us extremely well. 
